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Abstract. High-impact floods have become a virtually an-
nual experience in Malaysia, yet flood insurance has re-
mained a grossly neglected part of comprehensive integrated
flood risk management. Using discriminant analysis, this
study seeks to identify the demand-side variables that best
predict flood insurance purchase and risk aversion between
two groups of residential homeowners in three districts of
Johor State, Malaysia: those who purchased flood insurance
and those who did not. Our results revealed an overall 34 %
purchase rate, with Kota Tinggi district having the highest
(44 %) and thus the highest degree of flood risk aversion.
The Wilks’ lambda F test for equality of group means, stan-
dardised discriminant function coefficients, structure corre-
lation, and canonical correlation has clearly shown that there
are strong significant attribute differences between the two
groups of homeowners, based on the measures of objective
flood risk exposure, subjective risk perception, and socio-
economic cum demographic variables. However, the mea-
sures of subjective risk perception were found to be more
predictive of flood insurance purchase and flood risk aver-
sion.
1 Introduction
Flooding disasters are Malaysia’s worst nightmare in terms
of the overall area and population affected, frequency, finan-
cial loss, and psychological trauma. The real estate sector is
hit particularly hard. Historical records show that Malaysia
has experienced major flood events in 1886, 1926, 1931,
1947, 1954, 1957, 1965, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1988, 1993,
1996, 2000, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013.
It is estimated that the average annual flood damage in
Malaysia is about RM 3 billion (USD 912.8 million) (De-
loitte, 2003), which can negatively affect the nation’s GDP.
Records also show that the trend has been increasing. This
is glaringly obvious when one compares the two worst flood
events in the country: the 1971 flood cost RM 200 million
(USD 60.8 million) and resulted in the death of 61 persons;
the successive 50 and 100 yr floods hit Johor State in De-
cember 2006 and January 2007 and together cost RM 1.5 bil-
lion (USD 456.4 million) and led to the deaths of 18 persons
(MNREM, 2007; Badrul et al., 2010; Hamzah et al., 2012).
Threats of flooding to Malaysia’s coastal real estate could
be enormous when one realises that Peninsular Malaysia has
29 000 km2 total land area prone to flooding, thus putting
4.82 million people at risk (Liu and Chan, 2003; Hasan and
Minirah, 2013). This is compounded by the increasing urban-
isation and mounting evidence that climate change will exac-
erbate the flood risk (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2006, 2008; Bubeck
et al., 2012). Keizrul Abdullah, Director-General of Drainage
and Irrigation Department, has warned that as Malaysia ap-
proaches 2020 it should expect a serious flood management
challenge owing to an increased severity and frequency of
floods. In addition, the largest threat to the entire corridor
area may be the exposure of Malaysia’s 189 river basins to
climate change (MNREM, 2007; BERNAMA, 2007). Pun-
dits have warned that property owners in a high-risk area
should expect premiums to double in the coming years as
insurance firms operating in these areas experience cost-of-
coverage rise of as much as 100 % in the next 10 years (Ger-
rit, 2009). Some insurance companies in Malaysia have al-
ready started reporting flood insurance claims from affected
policy holders. It was also estimated that the December and
January 2007 floods cost insurance firms in Malaysia about
RM 100 million (USD 30.4 million). Yet the claims repre-
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sented only 7 % of the total damage compared to the RM 1.5
billion cost to the government (Singh, 2007). The reason for
low insurance claims from floods may lie in the fact that flood
insurance penetration rate in Malaysia is very low, about
5 % (Business Times, 5 March 2007), even though there are
huge business opportunities for flood insurance. In contrast
to the insurance industry, the government is paying massive
amounts for flood relief damages.
An argument for enhanced flood insurance penetration
as an integral part of a comprehensive flood risk manage-
ment in Malaysia could be established. Under the auspices
of the Public Works and Irrigation Department, the govern-
ment has over the years taken some significant structural and
non-structural measures to address flood problems. Amongst
structural measures are channel enlargement, construction of
levees and embankments, flood bypasses, river diversions,
poldering, and construction of flood storage dams and flood
attenuation ponds. Non-structural measures include restric-
tion of development along costal corridors, land use zoning,
resettlement of population, flood proofing, flood forecasting,
and warning systems. Despite these laudable measures, the
incidents of floods and attendant losses continue to increase.
The main reasons are fourfold: (1) the Public Works and Ir-
rigation Department has not or may not be able to protect all
areas or control all floods; (2) due to increasing urbanisation,
private construction continued in flood-prone areas (Chan,
1997); (3) based on observed records, the effect of climate
change on frequency and intensity of rainfall has become an
accepted reality; (4) even where structural measures are in
place there is always the probability of residual flood, which
Plate (2002) and Merz (2006) described as the remaining part
of the risk after implementing a protection system. Put dif-
ferently, residual risk is the portion of risk that remains after
flood control structures have been built. In essence, there is
always the possibility of a flood event greater than the de-
sign capacity of levees or embankments, which may result
in breaching or overtopping of the defences and flooding of
adjacent properties. As Kreibich et al. (2005) pointed out,
absolute flood protection is impossible.
In the US, UK and recently in Australia after the 2011
Brisbane flood, flood insurance has been adopted as a tool
for residual flood risk management to support and comple-
ment a non-structural approach. As a result, flood insur-
ance has been incorporated as part of a comprehensive inte-
grated flood risk management. However, this is not the case
in Malaysia. Flood insurance as a non-structural flood risk
management tool is not a common practice in Malaysia as
floods are still viewed as an “act of God”; moreover, it is
neither a legal requirement to have flood insurance for flood-
prone properties in Malaysia nor is there any incentive from
the government to promote flood insurance as an instrument
for flood risk management in the country (Keizrul, 2004;
Ho, 2009). Consequently, flood insurance has become a ne-
glected aspect of comprehensive integrated flood risk man-
agement in Malaysia. Flood insurance is also profoundly
under-researched not only in Malaysia but across South-
east Asia, where collateral damage to properties from floods
are frequent phenomena. Even numerous studies in South-
east Asia on flood resilience and adaptations strategies have
missed out on flood insurance or have paid it only cursory at-
tention. Though flood insurance cannot prevent actual prop-
erty damages or loss of life as structural measures would
do, it can significantly reduce the economic risk associated
with flooding. An insured property damaged by flood can be
replaced quickly without much financial stress to the gov-
ernment. A community with extensive flood insurance can
rebuild faster after a flood. Kunreuther and Roth Sr. (1998)
described flood insurance as serving the purpose of reducing
the economic impact of individual losses by arranging for the
transfer of all or part of the loss to others who share the same
risk. Similarly, Bubeck et al. (2012) conceive flood insurance
as a private mitigation measure which reduces financial con-
sequences for an individual once a flood occurs. The demand
for insurance is driven by an individual’s knowledge of po-
tential risk, who opts to transfer the risk to an insurance com-
pany that is in a better position to effectively absorb and di-
versify the risk. Hence, buying flood insurance is regarded as
one of the precautionary risk reduction measures taken with
flood-exposed buildings (Kreibich et al., 2011).
Residential flood insurance purchase requires both de-
mand and supply sides. The demand side is determined by
the households, while the supply side is mainly controlled by
the insurance firms. Our study focuses on the demand-side
aspect of residential flood insurance and thus aims to: (1) de-
termine the factors that influence flood insurance purchase
decisions and the degree of flood risk aversion among resi-
dential homeowners in three districts of Johor State; (2) de-
termine if there are significant attribute differences in the
degree of risk aversion between two groups of residential
homeowners: those who purchased flood insurance and those
who did not; and (3) determine the most important variables
that best differentiate and account for the degree of risk aver-
sion between the group of homeowners that purchased flood
insurance and the group that did not.
2 Review of related theories and literature
2.1 Prospect theory under flood insurance risk
decisions
Two popular theories used to explain decision-making un-
der risk or uncertainty are the expected utility (EU) theory
and the prospect theory (PT). EU is the standard and rational
theory of decision-making under risk that relies on a linear
composite of weighted probability outcomes to compute EU.
It is founded on the principle of diminishing marginal utility
and uses net wealth as the only reference point (Chateauneuf
and Cohen, 1994; Rabin, 1997, 2000a; Kunreuther and Pauly,
2005; Desrosiers, 2012). In regards to insurance decision-
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making, EU theory holds that people will purchase full insur-
ance only if the premiums are fair to a point where premiums
are equal to expected losses (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006a;
Ulrich, 2012). In the scenario of EU theory, demand for flood
insurance for a risk-averse person will be based only on the
offer of an actuarially fair premium that reflects full cover-
age, where benefits from the premium equal the expected
losses. Under this condition, the individual with insurance
coverage is not bothered whether there is flood or not. This
is because whether the flood disaster occurs or not, the util-
ity from coverage will remain the same. Perhaps that is why
Kunreuther and Pauly (2005) theorised that EU theory has a
constant absolute risk-aversion utility function.
Owing to the fact that EU is a rational theory that op-
erates on the assumptions of context invariance, availabil-
ity of full formation, and complete knowledge of all pos-
sible outcomes, it always predicts accurate probabilities of
outcomes and consistently selects the best payoff among al-
ternatives using linear probability weighting (Sebora, 1995;
Isenberg, 1989; March and Shapira, 1987). However, it has
been widely criticised for a lack of explanatory power (Ra-
bin, 2000a; Kunreuther and Pauly 2005; Sydnor, 2010; Ul-
rich, 2012). Moreover, Rabin (2000a) argues that if the only
reason people are risk averse is the diminishing marginal util-
ity of wealth–which is the only explanation for risk aver-
sion in EU theory–then they should be very close to risk-
neutral in modestly sized risks. Or as Desrosiers (2012) con-
tends, EU theory, with its associated decreasing marginal
utility of wealth, cannot provide a plausible explanation for
why individuals purchase moderate- or small-scale insur-
ance. Levin (2006) conceived that one of the limitations
of EU theory is that it treats uncertainty as objective risk,
where the probabilities are objectively known or at best serve
as subjective maps of the objective values of possible out-
comes (Sebora, 1995). However, predicting insurance pur-
chases based purely on objective measures may be mislead-
ing as perception of risk is often subjective (Kunreuther,
1978; Slovic, 1987).
PT was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
later examined and quantified further by Tversky and Kahne-
man (1981, 1992). PT argues that because of complexities in
decision-making, limited information, and analytical ability,
preferences are often not consistent and an individual often
does not use linear probability weights to determine values.
Rather, PT contends that context and subjective values influ-
ence decisions under uncertainty. As a result, decision mak-
ers may not select the alternative with the highest payoff and
may not use net wealth as the reference point as depicted
in EU theory. Empirical evidence suggests that people often
make decisions by comparing changes in their financial sta-
tus with reference to specific actions rather than the impact
of the actions on final wealth utility function (Kaheman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Kunreuther
and Pauly, 2005). Leaning more on subjective influence mea-
sures, Slovic (1987) and Botzen et al. (2009) pointed out
that people commonly evaluate and make risk decisions not
only on the basis of objective risk exposure but also from the
perspective of risk perceptions involving intuitive risk judg-
ments or risk beliefs.
Moreover, PT postulates that people, including modest-
risk individuals, are willing to take an additional risk by pay-
ing more in order to avoid loss. In support of this postula-
tion, studies by Pashigian et al. (1966), Drèze (1981), Cutler
and Zeckhauser (2004), Kunreuther and Pauly (2006a), Syd-
nor (2010), and Ulrich (2012) reveal evidence that modest-
risk people often buy insurance policies with premiums sig-
nificantly exceeding expected losses. PT explains this with
the concept of “loss aversion” and how people weigh prob-
abilities of outcome. In weighing the probabilities of out-
comes, people often overvalue small probabilities and un-
dervalue larger probabilities (Rabin, 2000b; Sydnor, 2010).
This is because there is evidence that people are more sensi-
tive to small gains/losses compared to larger ones (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980).
In the parlance of PT, this tendency for people to weigh
losses more heavily than gains is called “loss aversion.” Un-
der this notion, Rabin (2000b) and Sydnor (2010) pointed
out that the decision to take up insurance is determined in the
loss domain. PT encourages people to take actions to avoid
losses and maximize gain (Eckles and Volkman Wise, 2011).
Against this notion, Eckles and Volkman (2011) argue that,
in line with PT, people will “make insurance decisions in or-
der to minimize the domain where a loss is experienced and
maximize the domain where a gain is experienced.”
This study primarily supports PT, thus acknowledging that
the decision to purchase flood insurance will most likely be
motivated by gains and losses as well as agreeing that both
objective risk exposure and risk perceptions influence insur-
ance purchase decisions. The study also supports PT pos-
tulation that people, including modest-risk individuals, are
willing to take an additional risk by paying a more-than-fair
premium in order to avoid loss. Though Malaysians living
in flood-prone areas may rationally prefer the actuarially fair
premium, some people, particularly those motivated by loss
aversion, may realistically be willing to pay slightly more
than the fair price to avoid expected loss (ceteris paribus).
2.2 Literature review
A risk-averse homeowner would be more likely to purchase
a flood insurance policy (Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Smith,
1968). As Botzen et al. (2009) contend, actual purchase of
insurance by an individual is a good indicator of risk aver-
sion since it reveals a preference for financial protection.
Purchasing flood insurance is, however, contingent upon the
degree of objective exposure and susceptibility of the prop-
erty to flood, the homeowner’s perception of risk, and the
socio-economic cum demographic traits of the homeowner.
Numerous studies have highlighted the specific variables that
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/3297/2014/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 3297–3310, 2014
3300 U. G. Aliagha et al.: Factors affecting flood insurance purchase
underlie these three factors that could influence the decision
to purchase flood insurance to protect against the risk.
2.2.1 Objective exposure and susceptibility
A house location’s elevation may well determine susceptibil-
ity or sensitivity to flood. As such, the elevation of a building
has been observed to be one of the factors underlying a home-
owner’s perceived probability of losses. Homeowners whose
buildings are on elevated ground are less likely to purchase
insurance. Dixon et al. (2006) also found out that the prob-
ability of people purchasing flood insurance is considerably
higher in a coastal flooding area than at high elevation or in
non-coastal areas.
Also, the proximity to large bodies of water exposes
homes to flooding. Botzen et al. (2009) found that houses
near a river are more likely to suffer flood damage than
houses far away from a river once a dike breaches or is over-
topped by high water levels. As Dixon et al. (2006) posit,
proximity to large bodies of water that are subject to coastal
flooding serves as a constant reminder to homeowners in the
community of the flood risk they face. From their research,
Dixon et al. (2006) found out that a location with a higher
number of properties at risk of being flooded (known as a
special flood hazard area) has a higher demand for flood in-
surance. This argument is further supported by Kriesel and
Landry’s (2004) findings that property owners near a flood
zone are more likely to purchase flood insurance. Their re-
search shows that an increase of 1 % in distance from the
flood zone decreases the probability of purchasing flood in-
surance by 0.88 %.
2.2.2 Subjective perception of risks
Baumann and Sims (1978) found evidence that past experi-
ence with disasters motivates insurance adoption. They found
higher insurance uptake among homeowners who had suf-
fered previous damage from a flood. When estimating or
predicting the probability of flood, human beings tend not
to worry too much until they have experienced a distasteful
event, at which time they will learn from the event and bet-
ter prepare for the next occurrence (Kunreuther, 1978; Kun-
reuther et al., 1978; Epple and Lave, 1988; Kunreuther and
White, 1994). According to Burton and Kates (1964), the rare
and unpredictable occurrences of disasters make individuals
more unlikely to undertake any flood mitigation or preven-
tion. Dixon et al. (2006) found that flood experience serves as
a reminder of flood damages and thus results in a higher flood
insurance policy subscription rate among property owners.
Equally, the time of the last flood has been observed to have
an influence on the decision of a homeowner to purchase
insurance. Not experiencing flood damage for several years
has led to a decline in renewal rate for policies in compar-
ison to other types of insurance coverage (Kunreuther and
White, 1994; Palm, 1981). This means, in essence, that the
low probability of flood occurrence makes homeowners think
that it is not all that necessary to renew their flood insur-
ance policy since a flood is something that does not occur
frequently. Structural flood control measures, such as dykes,
levees, floodwalls, reservoirs, and bypass channels are tra-
ditionally used to reduce susceptibility, and as such percep-
tion of vulnerability increases when they are not provided.
The effect of this should be an increase in the subscription
to flood insurance. Ironically, the opposite is often the case
where they are provided. Levees create a false sense of secu-
rity among coastal residents who believe that they are fully
protected against future disasters and therefore feel no need
to take flood insurance (WMO, 2006; Kunreuther and Pauly,
2006b). Lack of knowledge and awareness as well as the fail-
ure of local authorities to seek eligibility for the coverage to
their communities has been blamed for the low penetration
rate of flood insurance (Browne and Hoyt, 2000). Browne
and Hoyt added that increasing information seeded into the
public’s awareness of the danger posed by the flood may in-
crease the penetration of flood insurance.
2.2.3 Socio-economic and demographic determinants
Homeowners feel reluctant to insure their property due to
premium and budget constraints. The decision to purchase
a flood insurance policy is dependent on a certain level of in-
come of the property owner. When one’s income is not even
enough to meet one’s immediate needs, purchasing flood in-
suring policy will not be included in the budget. Smith (1968)
noted in his model that people will forgo flood insurance
if the premium price for flood insurance is higher than the
probability of total loss from a flood. In their own view,
Browne and Hoyt (2000) noted that a decrease in the price
charged for flood insurance policy would eventually increase
the probability of purchasing flood insurance. Kriesel and
Landry (2004) added that the wealth of a homeowner may
also influence the decision to purchase a flood insurance pol-
icy: a homeowner with a higher income is more likely to pur-
chase flood insurance, and a higher income may lead to a
higher penetration rate. According to a research study con-
ducted by FEMA (1997), homeowners who have not pur-
chased flood insurance felt that they could not afford the
premium for flood insurance. Also, it is hard to convince
property owners to allocate a significant part of their income
to purchase flood insurance when losses have low probabil-
ity and are likely to be less than the subscription coverage.
Hence, homeowners feel that the expenditure on insurance
is a poor investment (Baumann and Sims, 1978; Johnson,
1978; Kunreuther et al., 1978; Palm, 1981). Lamond et al.
(2009) observed that homeowners might choose not to pur-
chase flood coverage because they expect that, in the long
term, the cost of damages from flood will be lower than the
sum of annual premiums. In contrast, Blanchard-Boehm et
al. (2001) found that those who have purchased flood insur-
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ance felt that the insurance will be able to cover the cost of
damages.
3 Data and method
3.1 Data
The data used in this study were based on a stratified random
survey of residential homeowners in three districts of Johor
State, namely Kota Tinggi, Segamat, and Johor Bahru. A to-
tal of 315 sets of questionnaires were distributed among the
homeowners in each district. Only 235 were received while
80 were not returned. Out of the 235 received, 28 were re-
jected because of incomplete responses. The remaining 207
were used for the analysis.
3.2 Instrument and measures
The questionnaire was designed to tap into homeowners’
responses to measures of objective risk exposure, subjec-
tive risk perception, and socio-economic cum demographic
variables that could determine their likelihood of purchasing
flood insurance and thus influence their flood risk aversion
orientation. Two variables were used to elicit measures of
objective flood risk exposure: (1) the distance from a flood-
prone river and (2) a house location’s elevation of property.
The two variables were measured on an interval scale. For
subjective risk perception, the measures are: (1) number of
high-impact floods experienced; (2) expectation of an in-
crease in future flood frequency; (3) likelihood of dropping
flood insurance if a flood is not experienced for 2 years;
(4) perception that flood insurance premiums are high but
willingness to pay slightly more than the fair price; (5) per-
ception of unreliability of insurance firms to pay insurance
claims and their reluctance to provide flood insurance cov-
erage; and (6) perception that the flood protection system is
not adequate.
The items were selected to measure subjective risk per-
ception because they reflect subjective risk judgements and
values, and there is literature in support of them. For exam-
ple, item (3) (“likelihood of dropping flood insurance if flood
is not experienced for 2 year”) reflects the respondents’ per-
ceived judgements of the immediacy of the flood and its ef-
fect. That is the extent to which the homeowners perceive
the risk of flooding to be reoccurring in the immediate fu-
ture affect their decision to renew or purchase flood insur-
ance. In our literature it was noted that the time of the last
flood has been observed to have an influence on the deci-
sion of a homeowner to purchase insurance. Not experienc-
ing flood damage for several years has led to a decline in
the renewal rate for policies in comparison to other types
of insurance coverage (Kunreuther and White, 1994; Palm
1991). Similarly, item (4) (“perception that flood insurance
premiums are high but willingness to pay slightly more than
the fair price”) proves that the subjective risk judgements
and values of modest-risk individuals go beyond the lin-
ear standard rationality that prefers an actuarially fair pre-
mium to show a more realistic world situation by accept-
ing a premium slightly more expensive than the fair price.
This was supported by PT, which postulates that people, in-
cluding modest-risk individuals, are willing to take an ad-
ditional risk by paying more in order to avoid loss. In sup-
port of this postulation, studies by Pashigian et al. (1966),
Drèze (1981), Cutler and Zeckhauser (2004), Kunreuther and
Pauly (2006a), Sydnor (2010), and Ulrich (2012) reveal ev-
idence of modest-risk people often buying insurance policy
with premiums significantly exceeding expected losses.
In the same vein, items (5) and (6) reflect subjective risk
judgements. For example, item (6) (“perception that the flood
protection system is not adequate”) reflects how the respon-
dents perceive the existing structural flood control measures,
such as dykes, levees, and floodwalls.
Except for question 1, all the questions tapping into sub-
jective risk perception contained statements that were de-
signed to elicit the respondent’s level of agreement using a 5-
point Likert scale (1 being strongly disagree, 5 being strongly
agree). Socio-economic cum demographic variables were as-
sessed using: (1) income level, (2) education level, (3) gen-
der, (4) race, and (5) age. Questions 1 and 5 were measured
on an interval scale, question 2 was on a rank scale, and ques-
tions 3 and 4 were on a nominal scale.
The study attempted to discover if there were signifi-
cant differences between those who purchased flood insur-
ance and those who did not, using the discriminant analysis
method. To this end, the dependent grouping variable (“do
you have flood insurance?”) is a dichotomous variable mea-
sured nominally as 1 being “yes, I have flood insurance” or
2 being “no, I do not have flood insurance”. The variable
was also used to classify the homeowners by whether they
were risk averse or not. As pointed out earlier, Botzen et
al. (2009) contend that the purchase of insurance by a person
is a good indicator of risk aversion because it represents a re-
vealed preference for financial protection. This is even more
applicable in Malaysia, where flood insurance is voluntary.
3.3 Participants
The research participants were selected based on a two-stage
stratified sampling scheme involving primary and secondary
sampling units in each of the districts. Based on this de-
sign, the 315 samples were selected from an estimated 45 000
owner-occupied residential houses within 7 km of a major
river flood plain in each district. The questionnaires were
administered face-to-face to homeowners aged 21 years and
older. However, the respondents who had no time to complete
the questionnaire either immediately or after the second ap-
pointment were given self-addressed stamped envelopes to
return the questionnaires.
Out of the 207 usable questionnaires received, 44 % were
from Kota Tinggi (N = 91), where 48 % (44) of them were
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male and 55 % (47) were female. 26.6 % (55) were from
Segamat, where 44 % (24) of them were male and 56 % (31)
were female. 29 % (61) were from Johor Bahru, where 46 %
(28) and 54 % (33) of them were male and female respec-
tively. In other words, out of the 207 respondents, 46 % (95)
of them were male and 54 % (112) were female. In terms of
race, 37 % of the respondents were Malays (N = 76), 52 %
Chinese (N = 108), and 11 % Indians (N = 22). In terms of
age profile, the pattern of response from the highest order
was 29.5 % (61) between the ages of 31 and 50; 25 % (52)
between the ages of 21 and 30; 23 % (47) between the ages
of 31 and 40; 15 % (31) between the ages of 51 and 60; and
7.7 % (16) above the age of 60. Even though the Malay re-
ceived the highest number of distributed questionnaires, the
response rate was higher among the Chinese. This is not what
we expected as the population distributions in the regions are
in 67 % Malays, 25 % Chinese, and 7 % Indians. Neverthe-
less, the total number of usable samples received was large
enough to carry out a discriminant analysis.
3.4 Method
Discriminant analysis was adopted as the analytical statistic
for this study. The rationale for its use lies in the fact that
the study involved testing group mean differences between
two groups of respondents: those who did and did not pur-
chase flood insurance based on a set of predictive variables.
A major advantage of the discriminant analysis is that it has
the capacity to analyse simultaneously two classes of means
and standard deviations of groups of samples or respondents.
The first class is the total mean score and standard deviation
of all the respondents of each variable. The second class is
the group mean score and standard deviations of subclasses
of respondents on the same variable. If the analysis involves
two groups of sample populations it is known as two-group
discriminant analysis. If it involves three groups of sample
populations it is known as three-group discriminant analysis.
In the case of this study, there are two groups of respondents:
those who purchased flood insurance (72) and those who did
not (135). Consequently, a two-group discriminant analysis
was adopted.
Discriminant analysis is an appropriate statistical tech-
nique for testing for equality of group means and building
a predictive model of group membership based on a set of
observed discriminating variables (Hair al., 1987). This al-
lows for a linear combination of two or more discriminant
variables that best differentiate between the groups. The rela-
tionship is expressed as the ratio of between-group to within-
group variances. The linear combination is derived from the
following equation:
Z =W1X1+W2X2+W3X3. . .+WnXn, (1)
where Z is the discriminant score, W is the discriminant
weights (discriminant coefficients), andX is the independent
discriminating variables.
Discriminant analysis provides descriptive statistics (total
mean and group mean) and inferential statistics identifying
and analysing group differences. Inferential statistics include
the F test for Wilks’ lambda, Wilks’ lambda model, stan-
dardized canonical discriminant function (SDFC), eigenval-
ues, canonical correlation, and functions at group centroids.
The lambda varies from 0 to 1: closer to 0 implies group
means differ and closer to 1 implies less group means differ-
ence. ANOVA (F) for Wilks’ lambda tests if there are sig-
nificant group mean differences. In other words, the F test
for Wilks’ lambda provides useful statistics to identify vari-
ables that make significant differentiation between or among
groups. The standardized discriminant function coefficients
were used to assess each variable’s unique contribution to
discriminant function. A low standardized coefficient im-
plies that the groups did not differ much on that variable.
The canonical correlation depicts the multiple correlations
between the predictors and the discriminant function.
The structure matrix coefficient shows the correlation be-
tween each predictor variable and the discriminant function.
Correlations that have loadings ≥ 0.3 are considered signif-
icant and therefore have practical significance (Hair et al.,
1998; Ndubisi, 2011). In group mean difference analysis, dis-
criminant analysis has an advantage over the t test because it
compares the groups in terms of group centroids, thus taking
into account the interactions between the individual variables
(Ndubisi, 2008). A necessary major condition for application
of discriminant analysis is meeting the assumption that the
variance–covariance matrices are equivalent for the groups.
This is often verified by Box’s M test of the null hypothesis
that the covariance matrices do not differ between groups. In
our study, the result shows similar log determinants and vari-
ances that are not significantly different (Box’s M = 16.725,
F = 1.108; p value (0.312) is greater than 0.05). Thus the
hypothesis that the groups do not differ is accepted, imply-
ing that it is appropriate to apply discriminant analysis.
4 Results and discussion
Concerning the flood insurance purchase rate, our results re-
vealed that out of the 207 respondents sampled in the study,
only 34 % (72) insured their property against flood while
the rest (66 % or 135) did not. This also implies that 34 %
homeowners who purchased flood insurance could be de-
scribed as more risk averse, ceteris paribus, than the 66 % that
did not. The flood insurance subscription rate could be con-
sidered somewhat low and below average. The breakdown
of flood insurance subscription amongst the three districts
showed that Kota Tinggi had the highest rate (48.3 %), fol-
lowed by Segamat (40 %) and Johor Bahru (8.2 %). In other
words, homeowners in Kota Tinggi and Segamat are more
risk averse than those in Johor Bahru in terms of flood insur-
ance. This is not unexpected because the incidence and sever-
ity of floods are higher in Kota Tinggi and Segamat. Table 1
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Table 1. Group mean differences and tests of equality of group means.
Tests of
Variables Group means equality of group means
[1] Has [2] Has no
Total flood flood Mean Wilks’
means insurance insurance diff. lambda F a Sig.
Number of high-impact floods experienced
(V-NUMEXP)
2.57 (1.32) 3.23 (0.97) 2.22 (1.35) 1.00 0.870 30.767 0.000
Distance from flood-prone river (V-DISTFD) 2.09 (1.51) 1.38 (0.87) 2.46 (1.64) 1.08 0.885 26.564 0.000
Elevation of property
(V-ELEVTN)
1.44 (0.49) 1.32 (0.47) 1.49 (0.50) 0.17 0.974 4.178 0.048
Perception of high flood insurance premiums but
willing to pay slightly more than the fair price to
insure house
(V-FLPREM)
2.57 (1.32) 3.23 (0.97) 2.22 (1.35) −1.00 0.870 30.767 0.000
Expect flood frequency to increase in future
(V-EXPFRQ)
3.19 (1.18) 3.18 (1.21) 3.19 (1.17) 0.01 1.000 0.002 0.963
Perception of unreliability of insurance firms to
pay insurance claims as well as their reluctance to
provide flood insurance coverage (V-INSREL)
3.21 (1.10) 2.92 (1.22) 3.36 (1.01) 0.44 0.963 7.856 0.006
Perception that a flood insurance premium is high;
not willing to pay slightly higher than fair price
(V-FLPREM)
2.86 (0.90) 2.45 (0.97) 3.08 (0.79) 0.63 0.890 25.370 0.000
I will drop flood insurance if I do not experience a
flood for 2 year
2.80 (1.13) 2.44 (1.27) 2.99 (1.00) 0.56 0.945 11.899 0.001
Income level (V-INCOML) 1.60 (0.89) 1.83 (1.00) 1.48 (0.80) −0.35 0.964 7.645 0.006
Education level (V-EDUCTN) 1.41 (0.78) 1.31 (0.62) 1.46 (0.84) 0.15 0.922 1.659 0.199
Flood protection system is not adequate
(V-FLPROT)
3.24 (1.22) 3.20 (1.29) 3.26 (1.19) 0.06 0.999 0.113 0.737
provides group mean scores and tests of equality of group
means statistics used to identify variables that make signifi-
cant differentiation between groups of respondents who pur-
chased flood insurance and those who did not. The column
for tests of equality of group means shows that the number
of flood experience (NUMEXP) the respondents have had
in the past has a strong discriminant power and emerged as
the most significant variable (λ= 0.870, F = 30.767, p <
0.001) differentiating between the group of respondents who
purchased flood insurance and the group of respondents who
did not purchase flood insurance. The result shows a very
high mean difference of 1.0 between respondents who pur-
chased flood insurance (GROUP1) and those who did not
(GROUP2). The mean value for GROUP1 is 3.23 compared
to 2.22 for GROUP2.
To further understand the explanation for the differences
in group mean, we carried out cross tabulation between flood
insurance purchase and flood experience. The results showed
that 88 % of respondents who purchased flood insurance had
experienced a flood two or more times compared to 42 % of
those who did not purchase. Moreover, 46 % of the respon-
dents who did not purchase flood insurance had never ex-
perienced a flood, while only 6 % with flood insurance had
never experienced flood and 7 % only once. This suggests
that there is an interrelationship between flood experience
and the tendency to purchase flood insurance. This may be
attributed to the fact that an increase in flood experiences
translates to a higher subjective risk perception and vulner-
ability which concomitantly could lead to demand for flood
insurance. In essence, the property owners with more flood
experience are more likely to purchase flood insurance than
those with less experience. However, the fact that 7 % of the
homeowners that experienced a flood once and 6 % of those
that never experienced a flood actually purchased flood in-
surance supports PT assertion that moderate- and small-size
risk individuals also voluntarily buy insurance. Our findings
are consistent with previous studies by McPherson and Saari-
nen (1977), Kunreuther (1978), Kunreuther et al. (1978), Ep-
ple and Lave (1988), and Kunreuther and White (1994) that
show the probability of purchasing flood insurance increases
with the frequency of flood experience.
The distance of a respondent’s property in the study
area influenced their willingness to purchase flood insur-
ance. As shown in Table 1, the distance of property from a
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flood-prone river (DISTFD) registered strong discriminatory
power and therefore was significant (λ= 0.885, F = 26.564,
p < 0.001) in differentiating between the group of respon-
dents who purchased flood insurance (GROUP1) and the
group of respondents who did not purchase flood insurance
(GROUP2). The variable shows a very high mean difference
of 1.08 between the groups. The mean value for GROUP1 is
1.38 compared to 2.46 for GROUP2. To investigate further
the underlying sources of these differences we performed a
cross tabulation between the distance of a house from a flood-
prone river and the purchase of flood insurance. The results
revealed that 76 % of respondents who subscribed to flood in-
surance lived in houses located less than 3 km from a flood-
prone river and another 18 % lived within 3–6 km. In con-
trast, only 46 % of the respondents who did not subscribe to
flood insurance lived in houses located less than 3 km from a
flood-prone river. Moreover, 41 % of the people who did not
purchase flood insurance lived in houses located more than
6 km from a river while only 6 % of the respondents who
bought flood insurance lived more than 6 km from a river.
What could be deduced from these results is that the nearer
a house is located to a flood-prone river, the higher the ten-
dency of the homeowner to subscribe to flood insurance. In
other words, proximity to a flood-prone river contributes to
the degree of risk averseness such that homeowners located
less than 3 km from a flood-prone river are more risk averse
than homeowners located beyond. This result coincides to a
great extent with the findings of Kriesel and Landry (2000,
2004) and Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2011) that proximity
of a property to a river has a positive effect on flood insur-
ance purchase. Our finding is consistent with previous works
by Baumann and Sims (1978), Kunreuther (1978), Dutta et
al. (2003), and Dixon et al. (2006) which show that the prob-
ability of purchasing flood insurance increases with the fre-
quency of flood experience, flood depth, and lower ground
location.
Elevation of their property (ELEVTN) has a weak discrim-
inant power but is still significant (λ= 0.974, F = 4.178,
p < 0.05) in differentiating between GROUP 1, who pur-
chased flood insurance, and GROUP 2, who did not purchase
flood insurance. While GROUP1 had a lower mean elevation
value of 1.32, GROUP2 recorded a higher mean elevation
value of 1.49. Moreover, cross tabulation of the house lo-
cation’s elevation with flood insurance purchase shows that
68 % of respondents who purchased flood insurance reside
in a low-elevation area while 32 % reside in a high-elevation
area. On the other hand, 54 % of the respondents who did
not subscribe to flood insurance property live at a low eleva-
tion while 46 % reside at a high elevation. These results are
expected because a low-elevation location increases physi-
cal exposure and vulnerability to floods, which culminates in
risk aversion. What these results suggest, therefore, is that
the elevation of a property in the study area does affect risk
aversion and determines whether the property owner is likely
to subscribe to flood insurance. These findings are also in
agreement with those of Dixon et al. (2006) and Kriesel and
Landry (2000, 2004), which hold that higher elevation of
property has a positive effect on flood insurance purchase.
The results of the tests of the equality of group means for
the three variables above (NUMEXP, ELEVTN, DISTFD)
provide sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis of equal
group means, and hence we conclude that there is a sig-
nificant mean difference between the group of respondents
who purchase flood insurance and the group of respondents
who did not purchase flood insurance in terms of house dis-
tance from a flood-prone river, house location’s elevation,
and amount of flood experience.
The expectation of an increased flood frequency
(EXPFRQ) exhibited poor discriminant power and therefore
was not significant (λ= 0.999, F = 0.002, p > 0.05).
Rather, there is more commonality of opinion than differ-
ence between groups who have purchased and have not
purchased flood insurance with the expectation of increased
flood frequency. Both groups shared the same anticipation
that flood frequency will increase in the future, but the extent
to which this could make a difference in the level of risk
aversion and likelihood of purchasing flood insurance is not
clear because the group mean difference is too marginal to
make a difference.
The price of flood insurance premiums (FLPREM) was
found to be a major factor in the decision to purchase flood
insurance. The variable demonstrated strong discriminant
power and emerged as third most significant (λ= 0.890,
F = 25.370, p< 0.001) in contributing to the differentiation
of the two groups on their propensity to purchase flood in-
surance. The basis of this difference may be seen in group
mean score. Regarding this variable, the group of respon-
dents who did not purchase flood insurance recorded a higher
mean score (3.08) than the group that purchased flood insur-
ance (2.45). The difference in group mean (0.63) was large
enough to make a significant difference. The group that did
not purchase flood insurance held the notion that the pre-
mium for flood insurance was expensive and was more un-
willing to pay a slightly higher-than-fair price compared to
those who had purchased flood insurance. Thus, GROUP 1
demonstrated more willingness to pay a slightly higher price
to protect against loss, which also implies that they are more
risk averse. The result is consistent with PT postulation that
people, including modest-risk individuals, are willing to in-
crease a premium somewhat higher than the fair price in or-
der to pay for expected losses (Pashigian et al., 1966; Drèze,
1981; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2004; Kunreuther and Pauly,
2006a; Sydnor, 2010; Ulrich, 2012). We also argue here that
if the homeowners are willing to take additional risk by pay-
ing a premium that is more than actuarially fair and could ex-
ceed expected loss, then their decision to buy flood insurance
may be influenced by loss aversion because they emphasise
their expected loss more than their expected gains. This result
is consistent with the findings of Smith (1968), MacDonald
et al. (1987), Browne and Hoyt (2000), Dixon et al. (2006),
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Kunreuther et al. (1978), Palm (1981), Lamond et al. (2009),
and Blanchard-Boehm et al. (2001).
The respondents’ views about the insurance companies
and how they affect the decision to purchase flood insur-
ance or not were tested. Results show that there is a signif-
icant difference in their mean value with respect to the per-
ception of unreliability of insurance firms to pay insurance
claims and their reluctance to provide flood insurance cover-
age (V-INSREL) (λ= 0.963, F = 7.856, p< 0.01). Respon-
dents who did not purchase insurance had a higher mean
value (3.36) compared to those who purchased insurance
(2.92). It could therefore be said that those who never pur-
chased flood insurance felt that it was difficult to interest in-
surance companies in flood insurance coverage.
The roles of income level and education were also ex-
amined. The contribution on an income level (INCOML) in
group differentiation was found to be significant (λ= 0.964,
F = 9.645, p< 0.01.) but the level of education (EDUCTN)
was not (λ= 0.922, F = 1.659, p > 0.01). On an income
level, examination of the group mean shows that the group
that had purchased flood insurance registered a higher mean
(1.83) compared to the group that had not (1.48). In other
words, the propensity to purchase flood insurance increases
significantly with income while education does not make
a difference. While GROUP 1 registered higher income,
which could increase the affordability of flood insurance, it
is highly likely the group suffered greater losses of wealth
(accumulated savings from income) from previous multiple
high-impact flood experiences that foster their risk aversion.
As Luigi and Paiella (2008) and Cameron and Shah (2011)
pointed out, households that face income uncertainty or suf-
fered loss of income from severe natural disaster exhibit a
greater degree of risk aversion.
On the perception of the state of flood defence measures,
there was a common opinion that the existing technical flood
protection systems were not adequate (FLPROT). Hence the
variable displayed poor discriminant power and did not con-
tribute significantly in differentiating between the groups
(λ= 0.987, F = 2.682, p > 0.05). Though examining the
group mean shows that GROUP 1 recorded a higher mean,
the mean difference was too marginal to make a significant
difference to flood insurance purchase or to the degree of risk
aversion.
Predicting discriminant function for group
propensity to purchase flood insurance
One of the objectives of this study is to build a model that
includes only the most important predictive variables that
best differentiate between a group of homeowners who pur-
chased flood insurance and a group who did not as well as
account for the group’s degree of risk aversion. To this end,
a stepwise method of enter/remove for deriving discriminant
functions is most effective (Huberty, 1994). A discriminant
function, also called a canonical root, is a latent variable that
is a linear combination of discriminating (independent) vari-
ables. The stepwise method selects only variables that signif-
icantly contribute to discriminant function and predict group
membership by selecting a variable that minimizes the over-
all Wilks’ lambda at each step. As a result, all 11 variables
were subjected to the stepwise method.
Table 2 shows that at 30 iterations and a 0.05 significant
level, 5 out of the 11 variables entered the model in the
following descending order of magnitude according to the
stepwise model: number of flood experiences (V-NUMEXP);
perceived high flood insurance premiums but willingness
to pay slightly more than the fair price (V-FLPREM); per-
ception of unreliability of insurance firms to pay insurance
claims as well as their reluctance to provide flood insur-
ance coverage (V-INSREL); distance of property from flood-
prone river (V-DISTFD); and income level (V-INCOML).
Table 2 also provides statistics for verifying the significance
of the discriminant function and identifying the variables that
have the greatest impact and correlation with the discrimi-
nant function. The table reveals a canonical correlation (CCr)
of 0.507, which implies that the function explained 42 %
(CCr2) of variance in the group differences. However, when
examining the function’s Wilks’ lambda (3), the function
is considered significant (3= 0.743, χ2 (df= 5)= 60.254,
p< 0.01). Thus, we substantively infer that there is a sig-
nificant discriminant function that clearly differentiates and
separates the two groups of homeowners on the basis of the
likelihood of their purchasing flood insurance as well as on
the basis of flood risk aversion.
The table also displays the standardized discriminant func-
tion coefficients and structure matrix correlation used to as-
sess each variable’s unique contribution in terms of impact
and correlation with the discriminant function. Consistent
with ANOVA (F ) test, the standardized discriminant func-
tion coefficients (SCDFC) and structure matrix correlation
(within group correlation) show that the variables that have
the strongest impact and correlation with the discriminant
function are “perception that flood insurance premiums are
high but willing to pay a slightly higher-than-fair price to
insure my house” (β = 0.452 and within group correlation
= 0.598); “number of high-impact floods experienced” (β =
0.428 and within group correlation = 0.658; “distance from
flood-prone river” (β = 0.369 and within group correlation
= 0.611; and “perception of unreliability of insurance firms
to pay insurance claims as well as their reluctance to pro-
vide flood insurance coverage” (β = 0.325 and within group
correlation = 0.333).
The classification result provides efficiency and predictive
accuracy of the discriminant function. The model achieved
a hit ratio of 80.2 %, indicating that 80.2 % of the residen-
tial homeowners were correctly classified as either having
flood insurance or not having flood insurance according to
their flood risk aversion orientation. The achieved impres-
sive hit ratio suggests that the model has practical signifi-
cance in predicting demand-side factors distinguishing be-
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/14/3297/2014/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 3297–3310, 2014
3306 U. G. Aliagha et al.: Factors affecting flood insurance purchase
Table 2. Predictive model of flood insurance purchase. Variables entered/removeda,b,c,d.
Step Entered Wilks’ lambda
Statistic df1 df2 df3 Exact F
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
1 Numbers of high-impact floods experienced
(V-NUMEXP)
0.870 1 1 205 30.767 1 205 0.000
2 Perception of high flood insurance premiums but
willing to pay slightly more than the fair price to in-
sure house (V-FLPREM)
0.803 2 1 205 24.993 2 204 0.000
3 Perception of unreliability of insurance firms to pay
insurance claims and their reluctance to provide flood
insurance coverage (V-INSREL)
0.781 3 1 205 18.978 3 203 0.000
4 Distance from flood-prone river (V-DISTFD) 0.760 4 1 205 15.955 4 202 0.000
5 Income level (V-INCOML) 0.743 5 1 205 13.932 5 201 0.000
Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients Structure matrix
(Within group
Function 1 Impact ranking correlation)
Number of high-impact floods experienced −428 2 −0.658
Perception that flood insurance premiums are high but willing to
pay a slightly higher-than-fair price 0.452 1 0.598
Perception of unreliability of insurance firms to pay insurance claims
as well as their reluctance to provide flood insurance coverage 0.325 4 0.333
Distance from flood-prone river 0.369 3 0.611
Income level −0.300 5 −0.328
Functions at group centroids
Has flood insurance 0.423
Has no flood insurance −0.811
Model validation statistics




Chi-square (df= 5) 60.254
Classification accuracy (hit ratio) 80.2 %
Sig 0.000
tween the group of respondents who purchased flood insur-
ance and those who did not.
The study probed into the reasoning for not purchasing
flood insurance. Figure 1 shows that 31 % of respondents
did not state any reason for not subscribing to flood insur-
ance while 14 % felt that it was not necessary. For these
two categories it is difficult to explain their positions but
suffice it to say they are either risk-neutral (indifferent) to
risk of flooding and therefore unwilling to buy flood insur-
ance or they underestimate the likelihood of a future flood
risk. Flood insurance will not be attractive to individuals who
think that a flood is not coming soon or perceive the loss
as low. Camerer and Kunreuther (1989), Kunreuther (1996),
Kunreuther and Paul (2006a), and Rees and Wambach (2008)
argue that households will likely not buy flood insurance if
they underestimate the probability of a flood’s occurrence.
21.32 % respondents noted that they did not purchase flood
insurance because they were not living in a flood-prone area.
This group may be living in an area of higher elevation and
therefore see higher elevation as a substitute for flood insur-
ance. They may be said to have a low degree of risk aversion
because they perceive the probability of loss from a flood as
very low. 16 % did not have adequate knowledge about flood
insurance, which is also a potential source of a low degree of
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Figure 1. Reasons for not purchasing flood insurance.
risk aversion. This underscores the market failure to provide
adequate information necessary for flood insurance purchase
decisions. 7 % stated the refusal of insurance companies to
cover property as their main reason for not buying flood in-
surance. This category is risk averse and willing to pay a pre-
mium for property but is unable to get an insurance company
to agree to provide the coverage. High premiums charged by
insurance companies were a major reason for 6 % of the re-
spondents. This category is risk averse but, given their level
of income or wealth, they were unwilling to buy an unfair
insurance policy in which the premium was higher than the
expected value of the claims should the adverse event (flood)
occur. Some other reasons given by the respondents for not
purchasing flood insurance, which could also account for low
degree of risk aversion, include: low probability of experi-
encing a flood (2 %) and the perception that a building is too
old (1 %).
5 Conclusions
The cardinal objective of this study is to determine the flood
insurance penetration rate among residential homeowners in
three districts of Johor, predict the variables that best differ-
entiate between a group of homeowners who purchased flood
insurance and a group who did not, based on their likelihood
of purchasing flood insurance, and determine the groups’ de-
grees of flood risk aversion. Our results revealed a 34 % pen-
etration rate, with Kota Tinggi having the highest penetra-
tion (44 %) and thus the highest degree of flood risk aver-
sion. Overall we can say the flood insurance subscription
rate is below average. The Wilks’ lambda F test for equality
of group means, SCDFC, structure correlation, and canoni-
cal correlation have clearly shown that there are strong sig-
nificant differences between the two groups of homeowners
based on their objective flood risk exposure, subjective risks
perception, and socio-economic cum demographic variables.
The most important variables distinguishing between
those who did purchase flood insurance and those who did
not were the following: the number of high-impact floods ex-
perienced; perception that a flood insurance premium is high
but willingness to pay slightly more than the fair price; per-
ception of unreliability of insurance firms to pay insurance
claims as well as the reluctance of insurance firms to provide
flood insurance coverage; distance from a flood-prone river;
and income level. The variables constituted the dominant
deciding anchors in the homeowners’ decision to purchase
or to not purchase flood insurance policy. Evidenced by the
SCDFC, structure correlation shows that subjective risk per-
ception measures (such as the number of high-impact floods
experienced) were found to have more impact and, within
the groups, more correlation with flood insurance decision
and flood risk aversion than measures of objective flood risk
exposure vis-à-vis the distance from a flood-prone river.
The research has some notable implications. The results
showed the two groups have a convergence of opinion on the
expectation of future increases in flood frequency and on the
perception that existing technical flood protection systems
are not adequate. Hence there is a common apprehension
about the greater vulnerability of their property under the cur-
rently poor state of the flood defence systems and about the
foreseeable increase in flood frequency. To reduce this appre-
hension it may be necessary to enhance the structural flood
defence systems. Though some of the homeowners said they
may drop flood insurance if they do not experience a flood for
about 2 years, this may not lead to a substantial drop in flood
insurance subscription. It was noted that 16 % of the group of
homeowners who did not purchase insurance indicated that
they did not have adequate knowledge about flood insurance.
Thus, we recommend a flood-risk awareness programme that
includes a flood insurance promotion in flood-hit coastal ar-
eas. It was clear from our findings that unreliability of insur-
ance firms in paying insurance claims as well as their reluc-
tance to provide flood insurance coverage was a significant
factor, accounting for the difference in flood insurance pur-
chase. Specifically, 7 % of the non-purchasing group stated
the refusal of insurance companies to cover property as their
main reason. Against this backdrop, there is a need for fur-
ther investigation into reasons insurance firms are reluctant to
provide flood insurance and examine ways to sensitize and
incentivize them to provide coverage. Policies that compel
insurance firms that provide flood insurance to redeem insur-
ance claims will instil confidence among policy takers and
also increase flood insurance subscription.
On the implications for theory, we conclude that in the
light of the findings, it is pertinent to say that our results
coincide more closely with PT than with EU theory. This
is primarily because there is evidence that (a) the group of
homeowners with insurance coverage demonstrated more
willingness to pay a premium slightly higher than actuarially
fair to protect against loss, which implies that their decision
to purchase flood insurance is mainly influenced by loss
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aversion as they emphasize their expected loss more than
expected gains; (b) decisions to purchase flood insurance
are motivated by both objective risk exposure and subjective
risk perceptions, with the latter having more influence; and
(c) some homeowners that experienced a flood once or
never experienced a flood purchased flood insurance, which
supports PT contention that moderate- and small-size risk
individuals could also voluntarily buy insurance. Neverthe-
less, there was a clear instance where the result holds for
EU theory. About 6 % of risk-averse EU maximizers were
not willing to buy an unfair insurance coverage when the
premium is higher than the expected value of the claims
should the adverse flood event occur.
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Reviewed by: two anonymous referees
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